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Workshop report
Adapting NATO’s Deterrence Posture:
The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept
and Implications for Nuclear Policy, 
Non-Proliferation, Arms Control, and Disarmament:
A Report on a Workshop in Tallinn, 4-6 May 2011
On 4-6 May 2011 the Estonian Ministry of Defense hosted and co-sponso-red a workshop in Tallinn concerning the challenges of adapting NATO’s deterrence posture in light of the new Strategic Concept approved at 
the November 2010 Lisbon Summit.1 The workshop focused on issues likely to fi-
gure in the NATO Deterrence and Defense Posture Review (DDPR) commissioned 
at the Lisbon Summit.  The main points raised in the discussions were as follows:
The Alliance’s deterrence and defense posture should be strengthened not 
only in order to prevent aggression against the Allies but also in view of their 
responsibilities outside the NATO area.
While the NATO Allies choose for multiple reasons not to name publicly 
the objects of their deterrence efforts, they should be frank in their internal 
delberations.
The DDPR will examine the full range of capabilities, but it must look beyond 
capabilities to the political dimension of deterrence.
Cyber capabilities pose an array of unprecedented and unresolved challenges 
for NATO deterrence strategy and operations.
The Alliance’s deterrence and defense policy should encompass space secu-
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rity issues.
The continuing decline in NATO European defense spen-
ding makes the achievement of reduced reliance on nu-
clear deterrence doubtful.
The DDPR should consider whether and how the Alliance 
could articulate a clearer and more effective declaratory 
policy for nuclear deterrence.
Workshop participants differed on whether NATO can or 
should offer negative security assurances.
Missile defenses could contribute to deterrence in mul-
tiple ways but cannot provide a substitute for Alliance 
nuclear deterrence forces.
Workshop participants generally agreed that missile de-
fenses cannot provide a substitute for nuclear sharing 
arrangements.
Workshop participants differed regarding the importan-
ce of sustaining current and long-standing arrangements 
for risk- and responsibility-sharing in nuclear deterrence.
The possible consequences of an end to nuclear sharing 
could include an erosion of assurance, a weakening of de-
terrence, and an end to meaningful consultations betwe-
en the United States and other Alliance members on nu-
clear deterrence policy.
Certain factors point toward continuity in NATO’s nuclear 
deterrence posture in Europe.
Several workshop participants highlighted the importan-
ce of continuity in nuclear sharing responsibilities for de-
terrence and solidarity with the United States. 
The Allies agree that, as indicated in the Strategic Con-
cept, the objectives of deterrence and arms control can 
be pursued together, and that pursuing them both at 
once need not pose problems for the Alliance, though 
these efforts must be coordinated carefully.  The Allies 
nonetheless differ in their priorities concerning nuclear 
deterrence and arms control and disarmament.
Russia values its non-strategic nuclear forces highly be-
cause of its conventional military weakness in relation to 
NATO and China.
While NATO supports establishing transparency measu-
res and negotiating verifiable reductions in U.S. and Rus-
sian non-strategic nuclear forces, the Russians have little 
interest in arms control affecting such forces. Moscow has 
set out multiple conditions for the pursuit of relevant ne-
gotiations.
The following report elaborates on these conclusions.
KEY INSIGHTS AND OBSERVATIONS
The Alliance’s deterrence and defense posture should be 
strengthened not only in order to prevent aggression against 
the Allies but also in view of their responsibilities outside the 
NATO area.
An American participant said that the Alliance has to be con-
cerned with deterrence not only in order to prevent aggres-
sion against the Allies but also to support its aspiration to be 
able “to project power in regions of WMD concern.”
Another American participant noted that the Alliance deploys 
forces outside the NATO area, and that these distant opera-
tions may be undertaken where “adjoining powers may have 
nuclear weapons and allies with nuclear weapons.”  Should 
these NATO forces be provided with nuclear deterrence pro-
tection and, if so, how?
A Spanish participant said in this regard that “the next step” 
beyond U.S. extended deterrence protection to NATO Europe 
should be “NATO extended deterrence” — that is, the Alliance 
offering protection to non-NATO security partners involved in 
NATO operations.
A French participant said that the Libya crisis demonstrated 
that a situation requiring the threat or use of force can arise 
practically overnight, owing to a change in political circum-
stances.  In order to manage crisis situations, Allies are likely 
to turn to the Alliance or to form coalitions based on Alliance 
procedures and capabilities; and they need deterrence “insu-
rance policies” to handle crises effectively.
“During the Cold War,” an American participant said, “NATO 
had a single mission:  to deter aggression, prevent war and, 
if both failed, defend Alliance territory and populations and 
restore the status quo ante.”  In the post-Cold War era, the 
Alliance’s objectives have expanded, and it now requires ca-
pabilities “to deter threats of aggression against NATO, pre-
vent war, and defend against attacks and emerging security 
challenges; help deter, prevent and, possibly, counter hostile 















prevent others from interfering with NATO’s willingness and 
ability to act.”
An American participant said that NATO is more likely to have 
to deter a “weak rogue” than a “peer competitor.”  He said that 
North Korea had attacked South Korean targets twice in 2010, 
and demonstrated that a state can use nuclear weapons as 
a shield for conventional aggression.  “How can NATO deter 
that and deal with conventional aggression and control esca-
lation?” 
A British participant said that “scenarios in the Middle East 
are more likely than scenarios involving Russia.”  In his view, 
although today there are divisions in NATO about dealing 
with Russia, the divisions of the future will concern “how we 
view intervention if there is a threat of nuclear attack.”  In such 
circumstances, he said, there may be “different fault lines in 
NATO.”  An American participant said that there could then be 
“a temptation to neo-isolationism” rather than intervention 
by NATO.
While the NATO Allies choose for multiple reasons not to name 
publicly the objects of their deterrence efforts, they should be 
frank in their internal deliberations.
An American participant highlighted “the difficulty of deter-
ring potential adversaries that you cannot designate publi-
cly.” 
A Lithuanian participant noted that the 2010 Strategic Con-
cept did not repeat the following statement from the 1999 
Strategic Concept:  “The existence of powerful nuclear forces 
outside the Alliance also constitutes a significant factor which 
the Alliance has to take into account if security and stability 
in the Euro-Atlantic area are to be maintained.” 2  He said that 
even this subtle reference to Russia as a potential threat to 
NATO has become “unfashionable.”  As a result, he said, NATO 
has “a policy in search of a clear mission,” because Russia “can-
not be named” as a potential threat, even obliquely.  Some 
NATO Allies have incentives to avoid alienating potential 
adversaries — and, indeed, to cultivate positive political re-
lations with them — while sustaining and improving the Al-
liance’s deterrence and defense posture.
An American participant said that, in formulating deterrence 
policy, the Alliance needs to consider a basic question:  “Whom 
are we trying to deter from doing what to whom?”  This is es-
sential because “real life comes with details.”  The phrase “tai-
lored deterrence” serves as a reminder that deterrence is not 
a “one size fits all” endeavor.  A deterrence posture must be 
continually reshaped to remain relevant and effective.  
This American participant noted, “NATO can’t or won’t name 
adversaries.”  NATO treats its potential adversaries like Lord 
Voldemort in the Harry Potter series.  This villain is often called 
“You-Know-Who” or “He-Who-Must-Not-Be-Named.”  NATO’s 
attitude, at least with regard to public discussions, seems to 
be “the less said about potential threats, the better.”  This is 
not necessarily a problem for deterrence, however, because 
each potential adversary is likely to think that “it’s all about 
me” — “whether it is or not, whether NATO says it is or not.”  As 
a result, “NATO may be able to deter specific actors without 
naming them.”
A Turkish participant said that “to whom it may concern” de-
terrence might work, in view of the precedent set by criminal 
codes.  He noted that murder is prohibited, and no potential 
murderers are named and no steps are taken to communicate 
messages to the more probable murderers.  This is a contrast 
with the concept of “tailored deterrence.”
An American participant said that NATO has “to whom it may 
concern” deterrence as its public policy.  In their internal deli-
berations, however, the NATO Allies “need to think about the 
who” and “be a little franker with themselves.”
Similarly, a British participant said that in the DDPR the Allies 
should “be as precise as they can in intra-Alliance debate: 
name names and places, local force ratios, and reinforcement 
times.  The euphemisms and the discreet charm of the diplo-
matic corps should come later, at the presentation stage.”
A British participant said that the Alliance is constrained in 
naming adversaries not only by diplomatic sensitivities but 
also by “a very basic problem” — that is, “The Allies don’t have 
agreement on a range of threats and how to handle them.”  As 
a result, the Allies leave “ambiguous” the question of whom 
they wish to deter, and they hold that ambiguity is “best” for 
alliance cohesion and perhaps also for deterrence.
The DDPR will examine the full range of capabilities, but it 
must look beyond capabilities to the political dimension of 
deterrence.
An American participant said that the Alliance in the DDPR 
“will not re-open any of the questions settled in the new Stra-
2 North Atlantic Council, Strategic Concept, 24 April 1999, par. 21, available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27433.htm
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tegic Concept.”  It is, he noted, “misleading” to label the DDPR 
“NATO’s Nuclear Posture Review” because it will examine the 
“full range of capabilities,” including nuclear, conventional, 
missile defense, counter-CBRN, counter-cyber, and counter-
terrorist means. 
Another American participant said that the focus on capabi-
lities neglects the political dimension of deterrence.  To deter 
possible adversaries effectively, he said, the Allies need to un-
derstand their motives and intentions.  The Allies must study 
patterns of behavior and trends in order to define and tailor 
more politically astute strategies of deterrence. 
Cyber capabilities pose an array of unprecedented and unre-
solved challenges for NATO deterrence strategy and opera-
tions.
An American participant said that the Stuxnet attack on Iran 
raises questions for NATO.  “Was that a preventive use of force 
like Osirak in 1981?  It appears to have been an effective targe-
ted attack with limited collateral damage.”  He said that NATO 
should consider whether and how to develop a capability 
to conduct offensive cyber operations.  However, he added, 
“The Allies don’t want to talk about it.  It is taboo, compared 
to defensive cyber security.  NATO has no common doctrine 
on cyber offense.”
An Estonian participant said that the probability of cyber at-
tack for NATO nations is close to 100 percent, but cyber at-
tacks can be hard to recognize and accurately characterize. 
When Estonia was attacked in 2007, national leaders asked, 
“Who is attacking?”  The honest answer was, “We don’t know. 
We don’t have a proof, and we can’t identify any single party.” 
Estonia is still analyzing the data from the 2007 attacks.
An Estonian participant said that “national security planners 
have begun to look beyond reactive, tactical cyber defense 
to proactive, strategic cyber defense. Cyber security strategies 
are emerging together with awareness and capabilities.”  Ho-
wever, he said, it is an open and important question whether 
“the two most challenging aspects of cyber attacks – attribu-
tion and asymmetry – will make cyber attack deterrence an 
impossible task.”  
The attribution problem “undermines the ability to respond 
and deter.”  For the risk of punishment to be credible, “the vic-
tim must be able to prove the identity of the attacker,” who 
“enjoys the advantage of anonymity.”
The asymmetry problem resides in the fact that “civilian infra-
structure could be turned into an offensive tool in seconds.” 
This is one of the implications of “young men without a future” 
that have access to the Internet.
An American participant said that cyber attacks raise the que-
stion, “Is this a prelude to something else?”  The cyber attacks 
might prepare the way for a terrorist attack or a conventional 
assault.  An Estonian said that all future conflicts will involve 
“hybrid attacks” in that they will have a cyber component.
A French participant said that MC 14/3 offers a “helpful” and 
“commonsensical” conceptual framework that the Allies could 
benefit from.  Concepts in this document such as “direct de-
fense” and “deliberate escalation” could, for example, apply to 
cyber contingencies.
The Alliance’s deterrence and defense policy should encom-
pass space security issues.
A Spanish participant argued that the Alliance should adopt a 
more unified and explicit policy about the security of the spa-
ce systems that NATO forces depend upon in their operations. 
It was a positive sign, he said, that the 2010 Strategic Con-
cept stated that “A number of significant technology-related 
trends – including the development of laser weapons, elec-
tronic warfare and technologies that impede access to space 
– appear poised to have major global effects that will impact 
on NATO military planning and operations.”3  In his view, it is 
nonetheless regrettable that the Alliance has not yet establi-
shed a space command or even an office dedicated to space 
security issues.  He noted that Allied Command Transforma-
tion requested the NATO space operations study completed 
in 2009 by the Joint Air Power Competence Centre,4  and 
recommended that the Alliance dedicate more attention to 
space security issues, including the policies and capabilities 
of powers such as China.  It is important that NATO be capable 
of deterring attacks on space assets.
The continuing decline in NATO European defense spending 
makes the achievement of reduced reliance on nuclear deter-
rence doubtful.
An American participant questioned whether the Alliance will 
be able to significantly diminish its dependence on nuclear 
3 North Atlantic Council, Active Engagement, Modern Defence:  Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation, November 19, 2010, par. 14, available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68580.htm
4 Thomas Single, NATO Space Operations Assessment (Kalkar, Germany, Joint Air Power Competence Centre, January 2009), available at www.japcc.org
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deterrence, in view of the uncertain funding prospects for 
missile defense and the declining defense budgets of most 
European NATO Allies.  A French participant said that NATO’s 
reliance on nuclear deterrence is actually increasing, owing to 
European NATO defense budget cutbacks and conventional 
force reductions, the shrinkage of the U.S. military presence 
in Europe, and the deployment of forces in missions outside 
Europe, notably in Afghanistan.
A French participant said that the idea that conventional for-
ces could play a greater role in deterrence is “hindered by de-
fense budgets in Europe.”  The cutbacks in defense spending 
by most European NATO Allies mean “a de facto increase in 
the U.S. contribution to European security.”  In other words, he 
said, “Some Allies want to rely more on non-nuclear deterren-
ce, but they are not willing to pay for it.”
A British participant said that European NATO governments 
have manifested “virtually nil” appetite for increased defense 
spending or for the “smart defense” solutions of combining fa-
cilities and pooling the procurement and maintenance of ca-
pabilities.  As a result, he said, “We Europeans are at a very low 
ebb.”  NATO European defense spending is “only a third” that 
of the United States.5   The cuts in conventional capabilities 
imply increased reliance on nuclear deterrence, he said, but 
some European Allies are showing an unwillingness to sustain 
nuclear-sharing responsibilities.
An American participant said that the Alliance may face “pro-
blems of credibility if the asymmetry grows” between the mi-
litary contributions of the United States and those of its allies. 
If the Allies fail to contribute, he said, “it reflects on their ca-
pability and willingness,” and “the asymmetry could become 
structurally destructive.”
A Lithuanian participant noted that the 2010 Strategic Con-
cept stated, with regard to arms control and disarmament, 
that “NATO seeks its security at the lowest possible level of 
forces.” 6  He said that this is “probably an inside joke” and “the 
one objective NATO is set to achieve with resounding success” 
in view of the continuing defense budget reductions by most 
European NATO members.
There is, a Lithuanian participant added, “a growing gap 
between the European Union’s self-image as a global strate-
gic actor and its actual capabilities,” which are “plummeting.” 
EU member states talk about boosting their Common Secu-
rity and Defense Policy, their European Defense Agency, and 
their battle groups, and then proceed to cut their defense 
spending.  In reality, he said, they are “addicts of American 
protection.”
The DDPR should consider whether and how the Alliance 
could articulate a clearer and more effective declaratory po-
licy for nuclear deterrence.
With regard to declared nuclear deterrence doctrine, an Ame-
rican participant recalled that the 1999 Strategic Concept sta-
ted that “The fundamental purpose of the nuclear forces of 
the Allies is political: to preserve peace and prevent coercion 
and any kind of war. They will continue to fulfil an essential 
role by ensuring uncertainty in the mind of any aggressor 
about the nature of the Allies’ response to military aggression. 
They demonstrate that aggression of any kind is not a rational 
option.” 7 
In contrast to this “ensuring uncertainty” principle, the Ame-
rican participant noted, “The new Strategic Concept includes 
no similar general theory of how deterrence is to operate.” 
This raises the question, should NATO articulate a policy that 
refers to its general theory of deterrence?
A Lithuanian participant said that the 2010 Strategic Concept 
displayed a certain “conceptual degradation” manifest in its 
failure to discuss the requirements of deterrence, including 
the need for U.S. nuclear forces “in Europe.”  He asked, “What 
could possibly replace that?” In his view, “At the end of the 
day, the NATO posture is about the DCA (dual-capable air-
craft) arrangement. If the current arrangement goes, so does 
any meaningful NATO nuclear policy.” 
A French participant said that “NATO currently lacks a decla-
ratory policy” for nuclear deterrence and that its policy is “too 
fuzzy and vague.”
An American participant described the term “non-strategic 
nuclear weapons” as “oxymoronic,” in that all nuclear weapons 
are “strategic” in their implications.  A French participant said 
5 According to the NATO Secretary General, “Ten years ago, the United States accounted for just under half of NATO members’ total defence spending.  Today 
the American share is closer to 75 percent – and it will continue to grow, even with the new cuts in the Pentagon’s spending.” Anders Fogh Rasmussen, 
speech at the Munich Security Conference, 4 February 2011, available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_70400.htm
6 North Atlantic Council, Active Engagement, Modern Defence:  Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation, November 19, 2010, par. 26, available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68580.htm
7 North Atlantic Council, Strategic Concept, 24 April 1999, par. 62, available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27433.htm
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that U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe are in fact “strategic” in 
their political significance, and that the Allies should stop cal-
ling them “non-strategic” or “tactical” weapons.  These terms 
create an impression that these weapons have a “war-figh-
ting” purpose when in fact they do not:  “None of our nuclear 
weapons is a war-fighting weapon.”
On the other hand, another American participant noted that 
such a change in terminology could have adverse effects by 
supporting the traditional Soviet and Russian position that 
U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe are forward-based strategic 
systems.  The Russians, he said, would almost certainly not 
agree to call their non-strategic nuclear forces “strategic.”
Workshop participants differed on whether NATO can or 
should offer negative security assurances.
In view of the differing negative security assurances (NSAs) 
of Britain, France, and the United States, a French participant 
said, the Alliance should strive to craft “a common policy ra-
ther than a single policy.”  For deterrence, he added, it may be 
“beneficial to have different NSAs rather than complete cohe-
rence and harmony.”  
An American participant agreed that “NATO policy needs to 
be consistent with the P-3 NSAs”– that is, the NSAs of Britain, 
France and the United States. It is nonetheless not clear whe-
ther NATO as an organization can or should articulate NSAs.
A German participant asked why NATO could not state nega-
tive security assurances.  He said that NATO could adopt the 
policy of the European Union, in which the strongest stan-
dard applies.  A French participant disagreed and asserted 
that in the European Union the lowest common denominator 
applies.
An American participant said that each nuclear weapon sta-
te offering NSAs decides on whether particular cases satisfy 
its conditions for honoring such assurances.  If NATO offered 
NSAs, NATO would have to decide on compliance with the 
conditions.  A French participant said that this could imply 
discussions lasting for weeks or months in the North Atlan-
tic Council, and this situation would not be constructive for 
deterrence.
Missile defenses could contribute to deterrence in multiple 
ways but cannot provide a substitute for Alliance nuclear de-
terrence forces.
Participants generally agreed that missile defenses may be 
able to contribute to deterrence in several ways but that they 
cannot furnish a substitute for the Alliance’s nuclear deterren-
ce forces.  For example, a German participant advocated re-
placing current nuclear sharing arrangements in Europe with 
missile defenses, but added that he supported the Strategic 
Concept principles holding that the Alliance requires “an ap-
propriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces” and that, 
“As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear 
alliance.” 8
An American participant said that missile defenses could po-
tentially contribute to deterrence in eight ways:  (1) buying 
time in a crisis; (2) enhancing deterrence by denial; (3) assu-
ring allies under attack in wartime; (4) dissuading proliferators 
of ballistic missiles; (5) providing an alternative to preemption 
or retaliation; (6) increasing freedom of action; (7) strengthe-
ning the credibility of U.S. commitments to allies and regional 
partners through forward deployed missile defenses; and (8) 
ensuring U.S. and allied technology leadership through missi-
le defense development.
A French participant added that missile defenses could some-
times offer insurance in the event of deterrence failure.  Ano-
ther French participant said that the contribution of missile 
defense to deterrence is “virtual” and “hypothetical” at pre-
sent, because territorial missile defense has yet to be deplo-
yed in NATO Europe and there are still doubts about the sco-
pe and effectiveness of the planned territorial missile defense 
concept.  In his view, the contribution of missile defense to 
deterrence will remain limited for many years to come.
An American participant said that missile defense “streng-
thens deterrence of states like Iran and North Korea,” but that 
it is “not relevant to deterrence of Russia” and “not a substitute 
for nuclear weapons.” Missile defense should be regarded, he 
said, as “a complement” to nuclear deterrence.  “Iran already 
has more missiles than the number of interceptors we will 
buy.”  Missile defense, however, can help in preventing coer-
cion and “take the cheap shot off the table” during the initial 
phase of a confrontation.
A British participant asked what the United States expects or 
wants from its NATO European allies in return for providing 
missile defense protection for European forces, populations, 
and territories.  Some Americans said that they would like to 
see increased European investments in conventional military 
forces.
8 North Atlantic Council, Active Engagement, Modern Defence:  Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation, November 19, 2010, par. 19, 17, available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68580.htm
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Workshop participants generally agreed that missile defen-
ses cannot provide a substitute for nuclear sharing arrange-
ments.
A German participant said that “NATO and its members need 
to extend its missile defense programs in order to develop an 
effective damage limitation option. . . . Today, the presence 
of U.S. nuclear forces in Europe underscores that the U.S. re-
mains engaged in Europe. An end of this kind of engagement 
is feared by many Allies to be the beginning of the end of the 
entire U.S. military engagement in Europe. At the same time, 
European allies value nuclear sharing because it gives them 
leverage within NATO’s decision-making process. . . . Therefo-
re, NATO needs to substitute nuclear sharing. The appropriate 
candidate is missile defenses.”
Other participants rejected this argument.  For example, an 
American participant said that “an effective damage limita-
tion option” via missile defense would be far beyond what the 
United States and its NATO Allies envisage for missile defense, 
and that even the limited missile defenses that the Alliance 
has agreed to pursue will be much costlier than the continua-
tion of long-standing nuclear sharing arrangements.
  
A French participant said that, even if the Europeans were 
prepared to spend tens of billions of euros on missile defense 
in support of the European Phased Adaptive Approach envi-
saged by the United States, this would not produce “an effec-
tive damage limitation option.”  Another American participant 
said that it is misleading to present missile defense and nucle-
ar sharing as alternatives, as if one excludes the other or could 
substitute for the other.
An American participant said that the nuclear-sharing arran-
gements are “not expensive,” since the main additional cost for 
the Allies with delivery capabilities would be for the nuclear 
certification of new aircraft that would be procured anyway. 
A French participant said that the nuclear-certification of new 
aircraft would cost perhaps €200 million, and that this is “not 
much” compared to the costs of missile defense.  In his view, 
the financial argument regarding aircraft certification is “used 
as a pretext” to support a decision favored on other grounds.
Workshop participants differed regarding the importance of 
sustaining current and long-standing arrangements for risk- 
and responsibility-sharing in nuclear deterrence.
A German participant said that, “Provided relations with 
Russia do not become hostile, it would be inconceivable for 
Germany to spend money for new aircraft in a nuclear role 
given that even the conservative party, let alone all the other 
parties, intends to end the stationing of US nuclear forces in 
Germany as soon as possible.”
A French participant asked, “Does Germany really want an end 
to nuclear sharing and meaningful nuclear consultations?  Is 
that truly acceptable for Germany?”  Some Germans have 
even made the argument, he said, that deterrence is “old-
fashioned, obsolete, and wrong.”  If Germany pushes through 
an end to nuclear sharing and brings about the withdrawal 
of U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe, he said, it would mean 
that the Alliance would “sub-contract nuclear deterrence to 
the P-3” — that is, Britain, France, and the United States — and 
that the non-nuclear-weapon-state Allies would no longer be 
directly involved in the Alliance’s nuclear deterrence posture.
Another French participant asked, “Where is the German wil-
lingness to bear a fair share of the nuclear deterrence bur-
den?”
A British participant said that the Allies seem to be divided 
into several groups.  Some Allies, such as Germany and Nor-
way, favor movement on nuclear disarmament and hold that 
removing U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe would promote 
that objective.  Another group of countries, including France 
as well as Allies in Central and Eastern Europe, constitutes a 
“no-change camp.”  For the United States, he said, the priority 
has become maintaining the Alliance’s “cohesion and solida-
rity.”  In these circumstances, he said, “the arms control pro-
ponents may not be able to carry the day in the Alliance as a 
whole.”  He concluded that “the likely outcome is continuity” 
and consensus on the principle that “any steps taken must 
strengthen and not weaken the Alliance.”  If a formal decision 
for continuity is made, however, he added, “there will be ten-
sion with the countries that have to implement that policy.” 
The Bundestag and other parliaments “may refuse to pay,” and 
“governments are responsible to parliaments.”  Without a new 
consensus, he said, the current posture cannot be sustained 
for more than five to ten years.
An American participant said that withdrawing U.S. nuclear 
weapons from Europe and ending nuclear sharing would not 
“bolster deterrence,” and that such steps would therefore not 
be consistent with the Lisbon Summit Declaration mandate 
for the Deterrence and Defense Posture Review:  “Our goal 
is to bolster deterrence as a core element of our collective 
defence and contribute to the indivisible security of the Al-
liance.” 9  If the U.S. nuclear weapons were removed, he said, 
this would lead to an end to meaningful burden-sharing and 
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consultations on nuclear policy.
Another American participant highlighted the importance of 
trans-Atlantic risk- and responsibility-sharing by asking, “How 
viable is any deterrence strategy that depends on U.S. gene-
rosity, manpower, and weapons systems for its credibility?”  In 
his view, “This is particularly true for extended deterrence... 
Will revisions to the deterrence strategy include sufficient 
burden-sharing components to satisfy the United States, whi-
le being marketable in Europe?”
The possible consequences of an end to nuclear sharing could 
include an erosion of assurance, a weakening of deterrence, 
and an end to meaningful consultations between the United 
States and other Alliance members on nuclear deterrence po-
licy.
An American participant said that without nuclear sharing the 
consultation process might fail to provide effective assurance 
to the European Allies.  “I don’t know how NATO would su-
stain the process without shared operational responsibilities,” 
he said.
With reference to the U.S. consultations with the Japanese 
and the South Koreans, he added, “Talk doesn’t satisfy them. 
Why would it be different in NATO?”
Another American participant said that “a weakening of ex-
tended deterrence in Europe would send a message to East 
Asia” at a time when NATO needs to think about the implica-
tions of U.S. extended deterrence in Asia for global security.  It 
is in the Alliance’s interest that U.S. extended deterrence gua-
rantees in Asia remain credible and effective as means of war-
prevention, assurance, and non-proliferation.  The credibility 
of U.S. extended deterrence in Asia depends in part on the 
maintenance of effective U.S. extended deterrence arrange-
ments in Europe.10 U.S. allies in Northeast Asia such as Japan 
and South Korea are not entirely satisfied with their current 
U.S. extended deterrence arrangements, and some experts in 
these countries are examining NATO consultation and nuclear 
sharing arrangements as a possible model.  Indeed, some Ja-
panese experts have expressed interest in what they call “the 
‘German model’ of dual-controlled tactical nuclear weapons 
that Japan would not be able to operate without the United 
States.” 11
An American participant said that from a U.S. perspective 
“the unique nuclear sharing arrangements within NATO have 
continuing utility.”  The April 2010 Nuclear Posture Review sta-
ted, he pointed out, that “Although the risk of nuclear attack 
against North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members 
is at an historic low, the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons – 
combined with NATO’s unique nuclear sharing arrangements 
under which non-nuclear members participate in nuclear 
planning and possess specially configured aircraft capable of 
delivering nuclear weapons – contribute to Alliance cohesion 
and provide reassurance to allies and partners who feel expo-
sed to regional threats.” 12
In his view, NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements “provide as-
surance to Allies that the commitment to collective defense 
will be realized in even the most extreme circumstances—
and that the U.S. will remain deeply engaged in Europe.”  At 
the same time, he said, the arrangements “provide assurance 
to the U.S. that its allies are sharing some of the most diffi-
cult burdens that fall upon us and would be key partners in 
any future and immensely difficult decision regarding nuclear 
employment.”  Because of the importance of sharing arrange-
ments, he said, the Allies should “seek an outcome from the 
DDPR that shares the nuclear burden as broadly as possible.” 
The nuclear sharing mechanisms might include “common 
funding, peacetime basing, collective planning, joint exerci-
ses, and common missions.”  The Allies should also, he said, 
seek new means of burden sharing for the Alliance’s deterren-
ce posture, in both the nuclear and non-nuclear domains.
A Frenchman asked, “Would the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear 
weapons and the end of nuclear sharing make the Alliance’s 
deterrence posture more credible or less credible?”  In his 
judgment, “The likelihood of ‘less credible’ is not minimal.”
Another Frenchman said that Germany is “undoing what it 
achieved over previous decades” to make sure that non-nu-
9 North Atlantic Council, Lisbon Summit Declaration, 20 November 2010, par. 30, available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68828.
htm?mode=pressrelease
10 According to Steven Pifer, “The deterrence credibility of forward-deployable U.S. nuclear weapons for allies in East Asia . . . is enhanced by the fact that 
such weapons are forward-deployed in Europe. Deployments in Europe demonstrate U.S. readiness to forward-deploy nuclear weapons; were they to be 
withdrawn from Europe, how would that affect the deterrence credibility of forward-deployable nonstrategic nuclear weapons?”  Steven Pifer, The United 
States, NATO’s Strategic Concept, and Nuclear Issues, Nuclear Policy Paper no. 6, April 2011, p. 4, italics in the original; published by the Arms Control 
Association, the British American Security Information Council, and the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg.
11 Michael J. Green and Katsuhisa Furukawa, “Japan:  New Nuclear Realism,” in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., The Long Shadow:  Nuclear Weapons and Security 
in 21st Century Asia (Stanford, California:  Stanford University Press, 2008), p. 360.
12 Nuclear Posture Review Report (Washington, D.C.,U.S. Department of Defense, April 2010), p. 32.
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clear-weapon-state Allies are part of the Alliance’s nuclear 
decision-making.  The German lead in promoting the removal 
of U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe presents a risk that nu-
clear deterrence policy will become a P-3 matter, with Britain, 
France, and the United States making all the decisions and 
then presenting an annual summary statement to the North 
Atlantic Council.  This would, he said, be “very damaging” for 
the cohesion of the Alliance compared to the nuclear-sharing 
arrangements.  The “worst case” would be, he concluded, a 
withdrawal of the remaining U.S. weapons without an agre-
ement on a solid policy for the future.
A Lithuanian participant said that the unilateral withdrawal 
of U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe would be inconsistent 
with the “three no’s” commitment to continuity in NATO’s nu-
clear deterrence posture, 13 and that it would raise questions 
about a reconsideration of that commitment.  He noted that 
removing U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe would change 
a central aspect of NATO’s nuclear posture and pointed out 
that this would be incompatible with the clause in the com-
mitment stating that the Allies have no “need to change any 
aspect of NATO’s nuclear posture or nuclear policy.”  In his 
view, Central and East European NATO Allies generally want 
to maintain U.S. nuclear forces in Europe, together with non-
nuclear military capabilities.  “The more American weapons, 
nukes, boots, missile defense, Patriots, F-16s – anything – are 
on European soil, the more secure the Central and Eastern Eu-
ropean Allies feel.”  He said that he would paraphrase the title 
of one of President Barack Obama’s books and have “the au-
dacity to hope that there will be no change to the American 
presence in Europe” as long as there is an unknown number 
of non-NATO nuclear weapons in Europe.
Certain factors point toward continuity in NATO’s nuclear de-
terrence posture in Europe.
A British participant said that “two benchmarks” constrain the 
Alliance’s options in modifying its nuclear deterrence postu-
re.  First, he noted, the Strategic Concept included the com-
mitment by the Allies to “ensure the broadest possible par-
ticipation of Allies in collective defence planning on nuclear 
roles, in peacetime basing of nuclear forces, and in command, 
control and consultation arrangements.” 14   Even without the 
words “in Europe” with reference to U.S. nuclear forces, he said, 
this “implies continuity.”  Second, the Allies have agreed that 
future reductions in U.S. nuclear forces in Europe must involve 
Russian reciprocity.  This has, he said, become “a key determi-
nant,” because U.S. nuclear force reductions now depend on 
Russia, and the Russians are “not interested” in arms control 
negotiations about these weapons.
An American participant said, “all of the Allies need to com-
mit the resources to maintain NATO’s nuclear deterrent—with 
maintenance of DCA and crews and reliable command and 
control, security upgrades at storage sites, and a renewal of 
commitment to leadership focus and institutional excellence.” 
In this regard he cited the Schlesinger panel report calling for 
“planning processes that are well exercised” and other mea-
sures to lend credibility to the Alliance’s nuclear posture for 
deterrence and assurance. 15
Several workshop participants highlighted the importance of 
continuity in nuclear sharing responsibilities for deterrence 
and solidarity with the United States.
For example, an American participant said, “The willingness 
of non-nuclear-weapon-state NATO Allies to prepare to par-
ticipate in, support, and plan for nuclear contingencies is a 
serious act and therefore sends an important message about 
Alliance cohesion and risk- and responsibility-sharing both to 
the United States and to the Alliance’s potential adversaries.”
This American participant said that the United States will in 
the coming decades face demands on its military resources in 
the Middle East and Asia-Pacific regions and increased costs, 
owing to the need to invest in precision-guided munitions 
and C4ISR capabilities, in an era in which U.S. government 
spending will come under great pressure.  He asked, “Is this 
the kind of context in which European nations should push, 
even or perhaps especially symbolically, for the United States 
to shoulder a greater share of the overall Alliance security bur-
den, conceived in both symbolic as well as concrete terms?  If 
13 “The member States of NATO reiterate that they have no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members, 
nor any need to change any aspect of NATO’s nuclear posture or nuclear policy — and do not foresee any future need to do so.” Founding Act on Mutual 
Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation, Paris, 27 May 1997, available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/offi-
cial_texts_25468.htm
14 North Atlantic Council, Active Engagement, Modern Defence:  Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation, November 19, 2010, par. 17, available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68580.htm
15 James R. Schlesinger, Chairman, Report of the Secretary of Defense Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management, Phase II:  Review of the 
DoD Nuclear Mission (Arlington, Virginia, Secretary of Defense Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management, December 2008), p. 15.  This report is 
available at http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/PhaseIIReportFinal.pdf
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they are interested in the long-term solidarity and health of 
the Atlantic Alliance, I would advise them not to.  Maintaining 
a nuclear delivery capability among the non-nuclear Europe-
an NATO allies is a serious way in which the Allies demonstrate 
their willingness to ‘get their hands dirty’ for the sake of the Al-
liance’s collective defense. . . . Better to keep these links of so-
lidarity strong, particularly about the nuclear deterrence that 
has and must continue to be at the core of Allied security.”
The Allies agree that, as indicated in the Strategic Concept, 
the objectives of deterrence and arms control can be pursued 
together, and that pursuing them both at once need not pose 
problems for the Alliance, though these efforts must be coor-
dinated carefully.  The Allies nonetheless differ in their prio-
rities concerning nuclear deterrence and arms control and 
disarmament.
An American participant said that pursuing the goals of de-
terrence and arms control at once “will require the Alliance 
to meet a number of challenges in policy development, im-
plementation and communication . . . The pursuit of deter-
rence, nonproliferation and arms control in the context of a 
vision of a nuclear-free world is possible and, most probably, 
a political necessity. But it must serve Alliance security. To the 
extent that Russian and possibly other arsenals are reduced, 
and especially if Russian non-strategic forces are addressed, 
the proposed steps would reduce at least some of the nuclear 
threats that confront the alliance and thereby enhance its se-
curity. . . . If we do not reach the goal of a nuclear-free world, 
we will have to continue to deter and to reassure. In any case, 
it will be critical to consult within the alliance and to move in a 
way that does not undermine deterrence, as deterrence offers 
order, stability and nonproliferation benefits along the path.” 
A German participant said that many Germans see deterrence 
as “a dangerous thing” that “might have the effect of inciting 
proliferation.”  On the whole, he said, Germans today do not 
discuss deterrence but place priority on arms control and di-
sarmament.  In his view, there is “a risk of a deepening rift” 
among the Allies, because Germans are generally not con-
cerned about deterrence, and certainly not to the extent that 
the Central and Eastern European Allies and the P-3 countries 
(Britain, France, and the United States) are concerned.  There 
is, he said, “no debate” in Germany about burden-sharing in 
support of deterrence.  “In general,” he concluded, “Germany 
seeks to improve political relations with adversaries to make 
deterrence unnecessary. . .  The ideological focus on arms con-
trol leads to rather one-sided advocacy, with no debate in the 
elite and the public sphere about how deterrence could be 
made workable.”
An American participant said that it is “very unhealthy” to 
have a dialogue on nuclear deterrence between the United 
States and the non-nuclear-weapon-state Allies from which 
Britain and France have excused themselves.  This represents, 
he said, “a failure” by Britain and France, because they are lea-
ving all the responsibility for upholding nuclear deterrence to 
the United States.  The Allies must, he said, be “prepared and 
resolute” in upholding their mutual defense commitments, in-
cluding with nuclear forces, or face the “fragmentation” of the 
Alliance.  NATO has been, he noted, “a nuclear alliance from 
day one.”
A Lithuanian participant said that Allied governments at some 
point will have to choose between maintaining nuclear deter-
rence arrangements in support of national and Alliance secu-
rity or pursuing nuclear disarmament in order “to be popular 
with the NGOs and the non-aligned movement.”  The Europe-
an Allies would prefer, he said, to see clear leadership deci-
sions by the United States “because they are divided and they 
don’t like making strategic choices and would rather have the 
Americans decide, as was the case in the good old times.” 
A British participant described the disagreements expressed 
by German, French, U.S., Lithuanian and other participants as 
evidence of a certain “Balkanization” of the Alliance.  The NATO 
Allies should, he said, “not assume that rational argumenta-
tion will win out over the observable differences in national 
strategic cultures within the Alliance.  After all the analysis, it 
may be better simply to avoid proposals which would crea-
te the most bruising confrontations.”  This is complicated, he 
said, by “a hijacking of Alliance policy by Germany.”  In his view, 
Germany is taking a “Here I stand; I can do no other” position 
that is “uncomfortable” for its Allies and that could make the 
Alliance “fall apart.”
An American participant said that “Germany’s domestic poli-
tics can be seen from across the Atlantic as forcing Berlin to-
ward a reduced commitment not only to NATO but also to the 
European Union’s Common Security and Defense Policy.”
If Germany maintains a stance against continued participa-
tion in nuclear sharing, an American participant said, this 
will have “huge implications” for all the Allies in that it could 
affect other Alliance arrangements and commitments.  A Bri-
tish participant said that a German unilateral decision would 
be inconsistent with the German concept of the Alliance as a 
Schicksalgemeinschaft, a community of fate.
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Russia values its non-strategic nuclear forces highly because 
of its conventional military weakness in relation to NATO and 
China.
A British participant said that “underlying Russia’s increasing 
reliance on nuclear deterrence and sub-strategic nuclear 
weapons is the change in how it perceives China. No longer 
does Moscow look east and see a mass industrial era military, 
but one rapidly enhancing its power projection capabilities 
through introducing high-tech systems and adopting its own 
version of network-centric approaches to warfare.”  When a 
group of Western strategic experts met with Russian counter-
parts recently, the Russians were asked about China, and “the 
room fell silent.”  Then a Russian said, “Do you really think that 
we could discuss this with anyone from NATO?”  For the Rus-
sians, the British participant said, China is “the threat that dare 
not speak its name,” and Russia fears “strategic isolation” in de-
aling with China.
Another British participant said that it is “commonplace” 
among Russian commentators that the use of tactical nuclear 
weapons is Moscow’s only means for the “de-escalation” of a 
military confrontation with China.  Some Russian commenta-
tors speak of this with “alarming levity.”
A British participant said that Russia’s level of attachment to 
non-strategic nuclear forces has increased over the past two 
years because the combat readiness of its conventional forces 
has been reduced by its defense reform effort.
An American participant said that Russians regard non-stra-
tegic nuclear forces as their only possible response to NATO’s 
conventional forces, and that the Russians would try to target 
C4ISR nodes for precision strike forces.
A British participant said that NATO’s intervention in Libya “de-
monstrates a scenario that some in Russia warned of — that 
is, NATO or the United States takes a dislike to internal pro-
cesses in a country and so takes sides and goes for a military 
option against government forces.”  The Russian reaction is, he 
said, to rely on the country’s nuclear weapons to deter such 
an intervention in Russia and to be cautious about negotia-
tions concerning these weapons.
A Lithuanian participant said that for the Russians nuclear 
weapons retain operational value, and the Russian threshold 
for use is not as high as for NATO’s nuclear-weapon states.  In 
his view, this constitutes an argument for NATO to maintain 
U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe as a visible deterrent.  The 
Russians, he said, consider it normal to parade Topol M ICBMs 
on Red Square.  “Can anyone imagine a parade of Minuteman 
ICBMs in front of the White House?”
While NATO supports establishing transparency measures 
and negotiating verifiable reductions in U.S. and Russian non-
strategic nuclear forces, the Russians have little interest in 
arms control affecting such forces.  Moscow has set out multi-
ple conditions for the pursuit of relevant negotiations.
A British participant said that the Russians “are not going to 
walk easily into negotiations” on arms control for non-stra-
tegic nuclear forces.  The Russians will, he said, wish first to 
monitor New START implementation and U.S. missile defense 
policy.
A French participant said that the Russians want the remai-
ning U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe to be removed without 
any reciprocal step on Russia’s part.  Even if the Russians pro-
mised to pull back some of their nuclear weapons from com-
paratively close proximity to Alliance soil, they could quickly 
bring them back to their original sites.  A NATO step to “lead 
by example” — that is, a removal of the remaining U.S. nuclear 
weapons — would be “extraordinarily hard to reverse.”  There 
is “an absolute lack of clarity” on the numbers and locations of 
Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons.
A British participant said that the Russians hold that before 
any talks on non-strategic nuclear weapons can take place the 
United States must first withdraw its remaining nuclear wea-
pons from Europe and dismantle the storage sites for these 
weapons in Europe.  Furthermore, he said, the Russians want 
NATO to address “the disparity in conventional military forces” 
between NATO and Russia.   
For some Russians, a British participant said, “No movement 
on missile defense means no movement on other issues.”  This 
Russian policy position has been repeatedly articulated since 
November 2010.
An American participant said that it is not clear what can be 
expected and achieved in further nuclear arms control nego-
tiations with Russia.  There is “no clarity on timelines” or on 
Russian openness to transparency measures or verified reduc-
tions.  In contrast with the U.S. and general NATO interest in 
near-term visible steps toward transparency and negotiated 
reductions, the Russians appear to attach no urgency to esta-
blishing transparency measures or negotiating reductions.
An American participant pointed out that Russian and U.S. 
priorities for the follow-on to the New START Treaty are “dia-
metrically opposed.”  In his words, “The U.S. favors another 
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round of bilateral negotiations that further reduce deployed 
strategic nuclear weapons, and address non-deployed and 
non-strategic warheads. Russia has shown little interest in fur-
ther reductions of strategic systems or non-strategic nuclear 
forces, but has spoken of multilateral negotiations that ad-
dress ballistic missile defense, non-nuclear strategic systems 
and space weapons. In addition, Russia seems to be linking 
these negotiations with resolution of Conventional Armed 
Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty issues.” 
Another American participant said that the CFE Treaty equip-
ment constraints reflect a late twentieth century conception 
of military power and do not cover missiles, unmanned ae-
rial vehicles, or information systems. The Russian assessment 
holds that, owing in part to precision guidance and C4ISR 
capabilities, in some circumstances “the United States can 
achieve near-nuclear effects with conventional weapons.” The 
Russians have, he said, suspended compliance with the CFE 
Treaty as a way of expressing dissatisfaction with the flank li-
mits and for other political reasons.
A British participant said that in assessing prospects for con-
ventional and nuclear arms control negotiations with Russia 
the NATO Allies need to “take into account the impact of ad-
vanced precision weapons, non-nuclear strategic weapons, 
and the ability to conduct network warfare to create dispa-
rities in conventional military power.”  This may enable the 
Allies to understand the Russian desires “to maintain mobile 
nuclear assets which can frustrate attempted pre-emption 
through dispersal.”  To this end, he suggested, the Allies should 
“conduct a full scale classified assessment of how the Russians 
really do now think about the correlation of forces, including 
the contribution of nuclear weapons of all classes in their 
competition with Alliance nations.”  The Allies might then “try 
conscientiously to address Russian and other concerns about 
this if CFE is to be resuscitated or new alternatives are to be 
created in some aspirational holistic arms control package.”
Some American participants observed, as one put it, that NA-
TO’s declared objective of relocating Russian non-strategic 
nuclear forces away from proximity to NATO territory presents 
“a problem for U.S. allies in East Asia” and that “relocation po-
ses problems for monitoring and verification as it would be 
difficult to detect reverse movements.” 16  Indeed, with the ap-
propriate aircraft and crews, the Russians could rapidly rede-
ploy non-strategic nuclear forces back to European Russia. 
An American participant said that negotiated reductions in 
U.S. and Russian non-strategic nuclear forces “would involve 
difficult and complex negotiating issues, including scope and 
verification, especially if warheads are a unit of account.”
* * * * *
The participants generally agreed that the workshop was 
productive and helpful in clarifying issues and renewing ties 
between the policy and analytical communities.  It was sugge-
sted that a future workshop might address issues associated 
with the Alliance’s Deterrence and Defense Posture Review 
after the NATO Summit in 2012. 17
16 According to the Alliance’s November 2010 Strategic Concept, “In any future reductions, our aim should be to seek Russian agreement to increase transpa-
rency on its nuclear weapons in Europe and relocate these weapons away from the territory of NATO members.”  North Atlantic Council, Active Engagement, 
Modern Defence:  Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, November 19, 2010, par. 26, 
available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68580.htm
17 For background on the 2010 workshop, see The Future of NATO’s Nuclear Deterrent:  The New Strategic Concept and the 2010 NPT Review 
Conference, A Workshop Report (Rome, NATO Defense College, April 2010), available at http://www.ndc.nato.int/download/downloads.php?icode=193. 
With regard to the earlier workshops in this series, see “Introduction to the Special Issue on NATO and Deterrence,” Strategic Insights, vol. 8, no. 4 (Septem-
ber 2009), available at http://www.nps.edu/Academics/centers/ccc/publications/OnlineJournal/2009/Sep/introSep09.html This special issue of Strategic 
Insights contains reports on the workshops in 2007-2009 as well as papers presented at the May 2009 workshop in Vilnius, Lithuania.  The papers presented 
at the April 2008 workshop in Rome have been published in Karl-Heinz Kamp and David S. Yost, eds., NATO and 21st Century Deterrence, Forum Paper 
no. 8 (Rome, NATO Defense College, May 2009), available at http://www.ndc.nato.int/download/publications/fp_08.pdf
